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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

EBEN BLOMQUIST,
Supreme Court
Case :lo. 17268

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
C. BINGHA.l~, MAURINE
BINGHAM and JOHN DOES
1-10,

~.ARC

Defendants-Respondents

STATEME1~T

OF NATURE OF CASE

This case was initiated by the Plaintiff-Appellant
seeking to enforce and validate as a contract for the sale of
land a certain Earnest '.foney Agreement and Offer to Purchase.
A Judgment and Decree of Specific Performance was entered by
the Fourth Judicial District, the Honorable J. Robert Bullock
presiding, on July 25, 1980.

On

appeal, the Plaintiff-Appellant

does not, apparently, contest the correctness of any finding of
fact of the Court below, but does challenge t:-ie propriety of the
conclusions of law drawn therefrom and the propriety of the
Decree of Specific Perforr.:.ance.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Respondent seeks affirmation by this
Honorable Court of the Decree and Judgment of the Court below,
the Honorable J. Robert Bullock presiding.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As there is no dispute in this appeal that the findings
of fact of the Court below were supported by the evidence and
Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief on Appeal cites extensively from
those findings, Defendant-Respondent shall limit this statement
to those findings critical to the ultimate conclusions and
Decree of the Court below, including findings not referred to by
Plaintiff-Appellant and to the records where opposite to the
issues on appeal.
:he Court below in granting to Plaintiff-Appeallant
specific performance of the contract, found that DefendantRespondents had waived the date of closing as stated in the
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase.

The Court found

that Plaintiff-Appellant notified Defendants-Respondents' real
estate agent on or about Oct. 1, 1979, that he was ready to close.
(See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Findings No. 's 7
and 11.)

~he

Court further found that the facts supported the

C:ollowing ·:onclusions of Law:
3. The contract had the effect of giving constructive possession of the real property to the Plaintiff.
~The Defendants oerformed no affirmative acts
whic::-, -,vould tenninate the constructive possession of
Plaintiff.

-2-
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While the Court below did find that the failure of
this transaction, which included the exchange of real prooerty,
was the "fault" of the Defendants-Respondents, no finding of
fact or conclusion of law was entered that the breach was willful I
The court below decreed the following

i~

support of

and in enforcement of the Judgment and Decree of Specific
Performance of the contract of the parties to this action entered]
on or about the 4th day of August, 1979:
It is further decreed that the implementation of the
Purchase Car.tract of August 4, 1979, shall be as follows:
(a)

The closing of the transaction shall occur not

later than ten (10) days after final disposition of this lawsuic,
including expiration of all appeal rights.
(b)

Payment shall be made by Plaintiff to Defendants

of TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000.00) down paument referred to in
the Earnest Honey Receipt and in paragraph 3 (d) of the Findings
of Fact herein at the time of closing.

i

I
There shall be no interes::

charged on the TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000.00).
(c)

One-half (1/2) of the interest on the principal

less the TEN THOUSAl'lD DOLLARS ($10,000.00) referred to in 2(b)
above of this Decree from the date of signing the Contract to t~
date of closing as set forth in 2(b) above should be waived and
forgiven the Plaintiff.
(d)

After the date of closing as set forth in paragcaD:,

2(b) above of this Decree, interest should be charged at the fuL I
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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rate of Ten Percent (10%) per annum, and all payments shall be
made as provided in the Contract.
1Jetween Plaintiff-Appe 1 1ant and
his attorney occurred at trial:
0
Mr. Blomquist, are you still ready, willing and
able to close this transaction -A

Yes.

Q

-- in the event it should be ordered by the Court!

A

Yes.
(T.R. at 80, 81)
The uncontroverted facts at the trial were that

Plaintiff-Appellant had not paid any taxes owed

by the Defendant-

Appellant, nor had any payments under the contract, other than
the $100.00 earnest money, been received or paid, including
payments under the contract due to Defendants-Respondents' seller
by Plaintiff-Appellant.

(T. R. 90 and 92).

The Plaintiff-Appellant

paid none of the taxes on the subject property to be transferred
under the contract to Plaintiff-Appellant on September 15, 1979,
(T.R. 90 and 92).

In regard to the payment of interest under

the contract, the following colloquv occurred between the
Plaintiff-Appellant and the Court:
THE ;nT~ESS: Interest from September 15 through
June 15. I'm assuming it will cake a few days to put
everything back into order.
THE COCRT:
THE WIT:TESS:
THE COURT:

At what

rate~

It's at 10 Fercent, I believe.
At the contract rate!
-4-
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THE WITNESS; Yes, And I'd be liable for that
interest now if we went ahead with the contract the
way it was set up.
(T, R. at 89)

ARGUMDIT
POINT I.
ENTRY OF A DECREE OF SPECIFIC PERFORXANCE AND THE
BALANCING OF THE EQUITIES BETWEEN THE PARTIES I:T
PROVIDING THE TERMS OF SAID DECREE, ARE DISCRETIONARY
WITH THE TRIAL COURT, AND SHOULD NOT BE REVERSED ON
APPEAL WHERE NOT CONTRARY TO THE LAW.
While the Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 9, does
provide that in appeals "in equity cases the appeal may on
questions o:: law and facts" this court has made clear that it
will review evidence in the light believed by the trial court
and not from the perspective of the appealing party.
Condrack, 478, P.2d 327 (Utah 1970).

Kier v.

While in the present case

appellant does not challenge the findings of fact of the Court
below, it is submitted that the appellant herein, in its brief
on appeal, is interpreting the facts as found by the court in
the light most favorable to that party, which is not necessaril:·
what the court found to justify its ultimate conclusions of la•.;
Furthermore, this court has expressed on issues
identical to those challenged on appeal in this case. i.e. the
trial court's authority to allow or refuse to allow interest to
a vendor found in breach in a contract to sell land. thac the
trial court must balance the equities, which necessa:cil:r entai: 5
some discretion on the part of the lower court.
Watts, 615 P. 2d 427, (Utah 1980).

Eliason v.

As stated in Eliason·
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When specific performance is granted. it is the
obligation of the courts to evaluate the equities of
the parties and to formulate a remedy that seeks to
place the parties in a position as similar as possible
to that which tl-_e" -.;r;•;'._.:_ '- ,-- .• bee:-, in had the conveyance been according to the terms of the contract.
POINT II.
THE DECREE OF nm COURT BELOW' WHICH ADJUSTED THE
EQUITIES BETllEEN THE PARTIES A...~D PLACED THEM IN THE
POSSESSION THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN rn HAD THE CONVEYANCE
BEEN TIMELY PERFORMED mmER THE CONTRACT' SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED.
It should be noted at the outset that the record does
not support the contention of the Appellant that the contract
between the parties in the present litigation was to be closed
and the option exercised on or about October l, 1979.

(Brief

of Appellant at page 5).
The date under the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to
Purchase

is

a closing date of September 15, 1979, which the

court below found waived by the Respondents herein.

(See

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Conclusion of Law No. 2).
It is submitted that this distinction is of particular importance
to the understanding of the actual Decree of the court below,
and in the balance of the equities.
In this case the Plaintiff-Appellant sought to affirm
the contract, rather than to rescind for breach by Defendants?.espondents; therefore he is bound by the terms of that contract
and cannot specifically enforce only those provisions to his
oenefit.

Farnswort'.1. ''· Jensen, 217 P.2d j76 (Utah 1950).
Appellant relies upon the holding of this Court in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Amoss v. Bennion, 456 P.2d 172 (Utah 1969), in asserting that
the trial court in entering of a decree of specific performanc,
in favor of the purchaser may deny interest on the purchase
price until the date of the entry of the Decree and postpone
the date upon which down payments and installment payments are
to be made,

It is submitted that Amoss v. Bennion, supra,

not on point to the present facts.

~s

This Court's decision in

Eliason v. Watts, 615 P.2d 427 (Utah 1980) should be decisive
of the issues.

wnile Eliason dealt specifically only with the

issue of interest upon the purchase price and not with grantb;
the purchaser entirely new periods of time for payments under
the contract, as stated by this Court in Amoss v. Bennion, I.Si
P. 2d at 174, "The two points are governed by similar principle:
of law,"
In Eliason v. Watts, supra, the vendor rejected a
tender of payment by the plaintiff pursuant to an earnest Jlone··
and offer to purchase.

The plaintiff successfully obtained

Decree of Specific Performance.

2

This Court, in Eliason laid

down the following principles concerning the purchaser's dut:i
to pay interest on the purchase price from the date of perforr·
ance under the contract:
The standard for determining the proper compensation to the parties was stated in Ellis v. ~ihelis,
32 Cal. Rptr. 415, 60 Cal. 2d 206, 384 P.2d 7 (1963)-,
as follows:
The guiding principle with respect to the calculation of the damages incident to the decree
of specific performance
is to relate the
performance back to the date set in the contract.
-7-
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!

Timely performance of the contract would result
in the purchaser receiving the rents and profits
of the land but being denied the use of the
purchase money, and a purchaser who seeks to
recover rents and profits must permit an offset
for his use of the purchase funds durincr the
period that performance was delayed. I~ an
early case this court held that a defendant in
a situation like the one before us should be
permitted to offset against the profits interest
on the entire purchase price. (Heinlen v. Martin
(1879) 53 Cal. 321, 343). This holding is the
overwhelming weight of authority.
(Citations
omitted.) See also In re Bond & Mort~age Guarantee
.C.0......, 271 A.D. 44, 62 N.Y.S.2d 685 (19 6), app.
denied 296 N.Y. 824, 72 N.E. 2d 15; Bostwick v.
Beach, 103 N.Y. 414, 9 N.E. 41 (1886).
(Id at
430) .
(8) In the present case, defendant's refusal
to convey the property was found to be "wrongful
in that it was in contravention of the contract
but it was not willful or malicious so as to
entitle plaintiffs to punitive damages." The
usual rule of credit for purchase money interest
against rental value should therefore be followed
in adjusting the equities between the parties based
upon their position had there been a timely conveyance.
(Id at 431).
This Court further noted in Eliason that only when the
vendor's breach is wrongful or willful in the sense of being more
than a mere breach of the contract terms, should the vendor be
denied any excess of interest over rents and profits.

Nonethe-

less. in the present case, it is clear that not only did Plaintif:-Aopellanc have complete control over all money required to
be oaid under the tenns of the contract to Defendant-Respondent
during the pendancy of t~is litigation and prior thereto, but
also had constructive possession of the premises to be purchased
by the Plaintiff-Appellant under the contract.
of ~aw

::10.

3).

(See Conclusion

This ri~ht to possession was not tenninated by
-8-
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any affirmative action of the Defendants-Respondents
of Law No. 4).

(Concl·~'

There can be no question in this case the

Plaintiff-Appellant has had the use and enjoyment of the r.:one ..
otherwise due under the contract and did n.ot approoriate it ::
otherwise set it aside.
Sec. 219.

See 71 Am.Jur.

22,

Specific Perfon2.:c.,

Furthermore, as shown in the statement of facts

·''I

Plaintiff-Appellant failed to pay any oart of the taxes or t:
Defendants-Respondents' seller, as required by the contract,·. :·:
is the subject matter of this litigation.
The Plaintiff-Appellant has not

appeale~

clair.:ing

error in that the trial court should have awarded him rents 2:.:
profits from the period of the date of performance to the er.::· I
of the decree.

The court below found that the Defendants-

I

Respondents were at fault, but there is no finding that this
means other than merely breaching the contract, nor is there
any finding that the Plaintiff-Appellant did not have the
beneficial use of the property tc be conveyed to him under .. ,
contract or that the

Plaintiff-Appellant did not receive re::',

and profits from the 120 acres.

The Plaintiff-Aopellant is

..J

required under the contract to convev to the Defendant-Pesocr..'
In cases in equitv, as well as in law, this Court will icidul:'
considerable deference to the Trial Court's findings and wrc:
the evidence is in dispute, will assume the trial judge be Ee·'
that which is favor:3.ble to his findings.

Tanner v. 2aadsStac·· ;

612 P.2d 345 (Utah 1930).
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The court below of course granted to DefendantsRespondents only one-half of the interest due under the contract
until the date of closing, minus the $10,000.00 due at the time
of closing as defined in the Decree and which otherwise would
have been due on Dec. 31, 1979.

As stated in the Statement of

Facts herein, the Plaintiff-Appellant testified under oath that
he was ready, willing and able to perform under the contract
immediately upon entry of the Decree of Specific Performance.
(See T.R. at 80 and 81.)

The Court certainly should have been

allowed to rely upon Plaintiff-Appellant's own statement in
balancing the equities and determining that performance should
occur as stated in the contract.

Indeed, where the purchaser,

prior to bringing suit for specific performance, sets his own
date for performing under the contract, and on that date fails
to perform. he will be denied any relief in law or in equity.
Nuttall v. Holman, 173 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1946).
Appellant has affirmed the contract.

The Plaintiff-

He should not be heard to

complain to the terms thereof.
POnTT III.
THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT GOVERN WHERE
THE BREACH BY THE VE:1DOR IS NOT WILLFUL
As noted above, the trial court did not find that the
breach by the Defendants-Respondents was willful or wrongful
or that c!:1ev were otherwise t!:ian in the mere sense of having
breached t!:ie contract.

It is submitted that the Court below

could not !:lave found the breac!:i willful as the record shows that
the

Plaint~:f-A~pellant

did noc personally contact the Defendants-
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Respondents or communicate to them on or about Oct. 1, 1979,
that he was ready 1 willing: and able to close. but only notif:ec
their real estate agent.

(~~~u~~g

of Fact No. 11)

In Farnsworth v. Jensen, 217 P. 2d 571 (Utah 1950)

t~::

Court held that the purchasers who obtained specific performanc 0 ,
of a real estate contract remained liable for the full amount
of interest as stated in the contract, and that the terms
the contract applied.

~f

This Court drew the critical distincticr.

between paid interest required as damages and interest orderec
to be paid by a court by reason of the terms of the contract
between the parties.

This Court quoted from 30 Am. Jur., Sec.:

page 6, in regard to interest required under the contract, whic:
states that interest "is as much an integral part of the debt''
the principal itself; and while it forms an element in comput::.:
the amount of recovery, it does so in a way that a provision
of the contract limiting liability, or any other contractual
provision as to the amount involved in the contract does."
In Farnsworth, Supra, this Court did require the
purchaser obtaining specific performance to pav interest from
the date performance was due or interest began to accrue undec
the contract.

As this Court stated in Farnsworth v. Jensen. , ..

P.2d at 575-576:
The provisions of the contract expresslv ?rovide
for the oavment of six oercent interest oer annum on
the unpaid.balance from. the date of the contract until
paid. The respondents have consistently denied that
they have repudiated the contract or their obligations
thereunder and have repeatedly insisted that the
-11-
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contract was in full force and effect over the entire
period.
If such is the case, then respondents must
carry out the terms imposed on them, whether they are
beneficial or detrimental. They adm.it the retention
and use of the money after the due dates of payments
and yet seek to avoid the payment of interest on the
amount retained because appellant was dilatory in
clearing title.
Conceding that appellant was not permitted to forfeit the contract for failure of respondents to perform
because she was in default, we are of the opinion that
her default did not alter or change the obligations
placed on respondent to pay interest on the unpaid
balance. The interest contracted for is payable to
appellant for resoondents' use of the money. It must
be paid at the agreed times unless there is some action
on the part of appellant which legally excused respondents from performing in accordance with the provisions
of the agreement. We are unable to discover evidence
in the record which would oermit a court to release the
respondents from the terms.of the contract nade by
them.
While this court did distinguish Farnsworth in Amoss v.
Bennion, 456 ?.2d 174, on the grounds that in Farnsworth, Supra
the breach was not willful and the purchaser had possession of
the property, it is submitted that Farnsworth v. Jensen

is

apposite in the instant case on the very grounds that the court
below found ?laintiff-Appellant had constructive possession and
the breach was not willful.

There is simply nothing in the record

to release the Plaintiff-Apoellant from the terms of the contract
made by him.
Indeed at least one court has held that where there
are contract terms specifically providing for interest, and
?resumably for the time payment of interest and principal, these
terms apply, and the rules in equity have no application.

As

stated by the i-"!innesota Suorene Court in Lund v. Larson, 24 :i.r.r.
-12-
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2d 827 (Minn. 1946);
(4,5)
..i..i..

would

Because interest is the creature of contract,
32em

::o

~o:..:...:r/'o'·

: ... 6

---::.,

~ -

-i

-·-

~

-,~-

-

3.2t':1-~d

rule is that, where a contract for the sale and
purchase of real estate contains express provisions
relating to the purchaser's liability for interest,
those provisions determine not only whether interest
shall be payable on the unpaid purchase orice, but
also all matters relevant thereto, such as the rate of
interest, whether installment :oavments shall bear
interest, and when interest shall accrue and cease,
even though the purchaser enters into possession of
the purchased land under the contract.
(6) Since there cannot be two conflicting rules
operating at one and the same time to determine the
rights of the parties under a contract with respect to
the same subject matter, the rule is that where there
is an express provision in a contract for the sale and
purchase of real estate relating to the purchaser's
liability for interest the provisions of the contract
govern with respect to the matter, and the rule in
equity under which an equitable obligation to pay
interest is imposed upon the purchaser in order to
adjust the rights and obligations of the parties has
no application. The rule in equity will not override
express contractual provisions relating to the same
matter. Security S. & T. Co. v. Latta, 118 Or. 559,
247 P.777; Barnett v. Cloyd's Executors, supra.
While Lund v. Larson, Supra, did not concern the

i

siw:!

of a defaulting vendor, it is submitted this rule does apoly 1.,·]e:I
the vendor's breach is not willful.

Eliason v. \fat ts, Suora.

The terms of the contract in the present case should
be specifically enforced in the manner provided in the Decree

~:

Judgment of Specific Performance of the court below.

CONCLUSION
There is nothing in the record to show that the :ireac .
of the Defendants-Respondents was willful or wrongful.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-r;- er efe'.
"-'

II

-13-

I'

the usual rules apply to allow the Defendants-Respondents interest
on the purchase price which the Plaintiff-Appellant has had full
use and enjoymenc chereo£.
Furthermore, in light of the findings of the court
below and Plaintiff-Appellant's own testimony as to being
irrnnediately ready, ·..;illinf! anc1 able to close upon entry of the
Decree, and in the balance of the equities, the Decree of the
Court requiring payments of installments under the terms of the
contract and requiring the Plaintiff-Appellant to pay one-half
of the interest due under the contract to the date of closing is
proper and should be upheld.
day of

DATED this

1981.

Respectfully submitted,
LAH OFFICES OF LOWELL V.

SUMMERHAYS, P. C.

By

CERTIFICATE Or SERVICE
I hereby certifv that a true and correct copv of the
foregoing Brief of Pla ~tiff-Apoellant was hand delivered this
1 "'f(-"=CZZ , 1981. to:
l- day of
~

_ /J
I

LORI~l
N. P~CT/
Attornev for Plaintiff-Aonellant
431 South Third East, 3-l·
Salt Lake City, CtM.'11

-~-fL--P...L.-!.~"--1---~)~11+----r--7Z~<1"'---'-----
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TAJ3U: OF CONTEtlTS

NATURE OF CA.SE

1

DISPOSITIOH IN LOWER COURT
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
STATEl1E!lT OF FACTS
ARGUMENT
POINT I

TRIAL COURT ERRED Ill FAILING TO
AUARD I'.~TERVENOR DAl1AGES ON LOSS
OF ATTAChI:D ANH1ALS . . . . . .

POINT II

TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
AWARD DAl1AGES ON LOSS OF FORCED
SALE OF CENTRAL MOHTANA LIVESTOCK
COMPAllY . . . . . . . . . . . .

POINT III

LOST BUSrnESS OPPORTUNITIES Ul
TRADING LIVESTOCK HJ MONTA.~A

POI~JT

TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
AWARD UITERVE!lOR DAl1AGES FOR LOST
OPPORTU!l!TY OF INTERVENOR FOR
TRADING TRAHSACTION AND PLAN IN
TEE FUTURE'S COMMODITY !1ARKET . .

IV

TRIAL COURT ERRED nl FAILElG TO
AWARD SUFFICIENT ATTOPJlEY' S FEES;
ADDITUR P.EQIJESTE::J AND JUSTIFIED

POINT V

CONCLUSION

POINT VI

TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF DAMAGES
DUE 10 AllXIETY, EMBARRASSMENT,
WORRY A:m COilCEPJl IS rnADEQUATE;
ADDI TUR IS Rf.QUESTED A!ID JUSTIFIED.

POINT VII

THE TRIAL COVRT' S AWARD ON PUNITIVE
DAllAGES IS I:lADEOUATE AND AN ADDITUR
SHOULD BE ~iADE AiiD IS JUSTIFIED
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